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Most experimental realizations of quantum key distribution are based on the Bennett-Brassard
1984 (so-called BB84) protocol. In a typical optical implementation of this scheme, the sender
uses an active source to produce the required BB84 signal states. While active state preparation
of BB84 signals is a simple and elegant solution in principle, in practice passive state preparation
might be desirable in some scenarios, for instance, in those experimental setups operating at high
transmission rates. Passive schemes might also be more robust against side-channel attacks than
active sources. Typical passive devices involve parametric down-conversion. In this paper, we show
that both coherent light and practical single photon sources are also suitable for passive generation
of BB84 signal states. Our method does not require any external-driven element, but only linear
optical components and photodetectors. In the case of coherent light, the resulting key rate is
similar to the one delivered by an active source. When the sender uses practical single photon
sources, however, the distance covered by a passive transmitter might be longer than the one of an
active configuration.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
The transmission of secret information over an insecure
communication channel constitutes an essential resource
in modern information society. Quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD) is a technique that allows two distant par-
ties (typically called Alice and Bob) to establish a secure
secret key despite the computational and technological
power of an eavesdropper (Eve), who interferes with the
signals [1]. This secret key is the main ingredient of the
one-time-pad or Vernam cipher [2], the only known en-
cryption method that can deliver information-theoretic
secure communications.
Most experimental realizations of QKD are based on
the so-called BB84 QKD scheme introduced by Ben-
nett and Brassard in 1984 [3]. In a typical quantum
optical implementation of this protocol, Alice sends to
Bob phase-randomized weak coherent pulses (WCP) with
usual average photon number of 0.1 or higher [4, 5].
These states can be easily generated using only standard
semiconductor lasers and calibrated attenuators. Each
light pulse may be prepared in a different polarization
state, which is selected, independently and randomly for
each signal, between two mutually unbiased bases, e.g.,
either a linear (H [horizontal] or V [vertical]) or a circular
(L [left] or R [right]) polarizations basis. On the receiving
side, Bob measures each incoming signal by choosing at
random between two polarization analyzers, one for each
possible basis. Once this quantum communication phase
is completed, Alice and Bob use an authenticated public
channel to process their data and obtain a secure secret
key. This last procedure, called key distillation, involves,
typically, local randomization, error correction to recon-
cile Alice’s and Bob’s data, and privacy amplication to
decouple their data from Eve [6]. A full proof of the se-
curity for the BB84 QKD protocol with WCP has been
given in Refs. [7, 8]. The performance of this scheme can
be improved further if the original hardware is slightly
modified. For instance, one can use the so-called decoy-
state method [9, 10], where Alice varies the mean photon
number of each signal state she sends to Bob. The mea-
surement results associated to different intensity settings
allow the legitimate users to obtain a better estimation
of the behavior of the quantum channel. This translates
into an enhancement of the achievable secret key rate,
which can now basically reach the performance of single
photon sources (SPS).
The preparation of the BB84 signal states is usually
realized by means of an active source. For simplicity,
we will first consider polarization encoding. (Note that
phase encoding is mathematically equivalent to polar-
ization encoding. Later in this paper, we will also con-
sider phase encoding.) There are two main configura-
tions; they are illustrated in Fig. 1 as cases A and B. In
the first one (case A in the figure), Alice uses four laser
diodes, one for each possible BB84 signal [4]. These lasers
are controlled by a random number generator (RNG) [11]
that decides each given time which one of the 4 diodes
is triggered. The second configuration (case B in the fig-
ure) uses only one single laser diode in combination with
a polarization modulator which is controlled by a RNG
[5]. This modulator can rotate the state of polarization
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FIG. 1: (Case A) Example of an active setup with four laser
diodes controlled by a random number generator (RNG).
Each source emits one different BB84 signal state (e.g., H
[horizontal], V [vertical], L [circular left] or R [circular right]
polarization states). BS denotes a beamsplitter. (Case B) Ex-
ample of an active setup with one laser diode together with
a polarization modulator controlled by a RNG. This modu-
lator rotates the state of polarization of the incoming pulses
to generate BB84 signal states. (Case C) Basic setup of a
passive QKD transmitter with linear optics elements. One
or more laser diodes produce different signal states that are
sent through a linear optics network. Depending on the de-
tection pattern observed in the detectors Di, different signal
states are actually generated. No RNG or active modulator
are necessary in this last scenario.
of the signals produced by the source.
While active state preparation is a simple and elegant
solution to implement the BB84 protocol in principle, in
practice passive state preparation might be desirable in
some scenarios [12–14]; for instance, in those experimen-
tal setups operating at high transmission rates, since no
RNG is required in a passive device. A passive trans-
mitter allows Alice to generate different quantum states
at random without the need to use an external source
of randomness. This situation is illustrated as case C in
Fig. 1. Alice can use one or more light sources to pro-
duce different signal states that are sent through a linear
optics network. Depending on the detection pattern ob-
served in her detectors Di, she can infer which signal
states are actually generated. So far, only entanglement-
based (EB) QKD systems have been designed to oper-
ate entirely in a passive regime without any external-
driven elements [12, 15]. For instance, Alice and Bob
can use a beamsplitter (BS) to passively and randomly
select which bases to measure each incoming pulse. In
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FIG. 2: Basic setup of a passive BB84 QKD source with
strong coherent light. The mean photon number of the signal
states ρ+45◦ and ρ−45◦ can be chosen very high; for instance,
≈ 108 photons. The parameter t represents the transmittance
of the BS; it satisfies t≪ 1.
this article, we show that both coherent light and practi-
cal SPS are also suitable for passive generation of BB84
signal states, i.e., one does not need a nonlinear optics
network preparing entangled states in order to passively
generate BB84 signals. Practical SPS (also called “sub-
Poissonian sources”) are those light sources which have a
smaller probability of emitting two or more photons than
an attenuated laser. Our method requires only linear
optical elements and photodetectors. In the asymptotic
limit of an infinite long experiment, it turns out that the
secret key rate of a passive source with coherent light is
similar to the one delivered by an active source. When
Alice uses practical SPS, however, the distance covered
by a passive transmitter might be longer than the one
of an active configuration. This result is caused by the
capacity of the passive scheme to reduce the multiphoton
probability of the source via a post-selection mechanism.
Passive schemes might also be more robust than active
systems to side-channel attacks hidden in the imperfec-
tions of the optical components. If a polarization modu-
lator is not properly designed, for example, it may distort
some of the physical parameters of the pulses emitted by
the sender depending on the particular value of the polar-
ization setting selected. This fact could open a security
loophole in the active schemes.
The article is organized as follows. In Sec. II we present
and evaluate the performance of a passive BB84 state
preparation scheme that can operate with coherent light.
Then, in Sec. III we consider the case where Alice uses
practical SPS. Finally, Sec. IV concludes the article with
a summary. The paper includes as well a few appendixes
with additional calculations.
II. PASSIVE TRANSMITTER WITH
COHERENT LIGHT
The basic setup is rather simple. It is illustrated in
Fig. 2. Suppose two phase-randomized strong coher-
ent pulses prepared, respectively, in +45◦ and −45◦ lin-
ear polarization, interfere at a polarizing beamsplitter
3(PBS). These states can be written as
ρ+45◦ = e
− υ
2
∞∑
n=0
(υ/2)n
n!
|n+45◦〉〈n+45◦ |,
ρ−45◦ = e−
υ
2
∞∑
n=0
(υ/2)n
n!
|n−45◦〉〈n−45◦ |, (1)
where |n±45◦〉 denote Fock states with n photons in ±45◦
linear polarization. The mean photon number, υ/2, of
each signal can be chosen very high; for instance, ≈ 108
photons. In this scenario, we will show that the signal
σout at the output port of the PBS can be expressed as
σout =
1
2π
e−υ
∞∑
n=0
υn
n!
∫
θ
|nθ〉〈nθ| dθ, (2)
where the Fock states |nθ〉 are given by
|nθ〉 =
[
1√
2
(
a†+45◦ + e
iθa†−45◦
)]n
√
n!
|vac〉. (3)
Here |vac〉 denotes the vacuum state, and a†±45◦ are
the creation operators for the ±45◦ linear polarizations
modes.
To see this, let us consider the interference of two pure
coherent states with fixed phase relation and orthogonal
polarizations, |
√
υ/2eiφ1〉
+45◦
and |
√
υ/2eiφ2〉−45◦ , at a
PBS. The output signal is a coherent state of the form
|√υeiφ2〉θ = e−υ/2
∞∑
n=0
(√
υeiφ2
)n
√
n!
|nθ〉, (4)
with θ = φ1 −φ2. The case of two phase-randomized co-
herent pulses can be solved by just integrating the signal
|√υeiφ2〉θ over all angles φ2 and θ, i.e.,
σout =
1
(2π)2
∫
θ
∫
φ2
|√υeiφ2〉θ〈
√
υeiφ2 | dφ2dθ
=
1
2π
e−υ
∞∑
n=0
υn
n!
∫
θ
|nθ〉〈nθ| dθ. (5)
Now, to prepare the signal states that are sent to Bob,
Alice performs a polarization measurement followed by
a post-selection step. By assumption, we have that the
intensity υ of the signals σout is very high. Therefore,
Alice can always employ, for instance, a BS of very small
transmittance (t≪ 1) to split these states into two light
beams: one very weak suitable for QKD, and one strong.
The weak signal is sent to Bob through the quantum
channel (see Fig. 2). The strong beam is used to measure
its polarization by means of a polarization measurement
which, for simplicity, we assume is perfect. For each in-
coming signal, this device provides Alice with a precise
value for the measured angle θ. In this situation, the con-
ditional states emitted by the source can be described as
ρout,θ = e
−µ
∞∑
n=0
µn
n!
|nθ〉〈nθ|, (6)
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FIG. 3: Graphical representation of the valid regions for the
angle θ. These regions are marked in grey. They depend on
an acceptance parameter Ω ∈ [0, π/4].
where θ denotes the value of the angle obtained by Alice’s
polarization measurement, and µ is given by µ = υt. In
practice, however, as we will show below, it is sufficient
if the polarization measurement tells Alice the value of θ
within a certain interval.
Whenever θ ∈ {0, π/2, π, 3π/2} Alice generates one of
the four BB84 polarization states perfectly. Note that
the creation operators for the polarizations modes in the
BB84 protocol, which we shall denote as b†H, b
†
V, b
†
L and
b†R, can be expressed, in terms of the operators a
†
±45◦ , as:
b†H =
1√
2
(
a†+45◦ + a
†
−45◦
)
,
b†V =
1√
2
(
a†+45◦ − a†−45◦
)
,
b†L =
1√
2
(
a†+45◦ + ia
†
−45◦
)
,
b†R =
1√
2
(
a†+45◦ − ia†−45◦
)
. (7)
In general, Alice does not need to restrict herself to
only those events where she actually prepares a perfect
BB84 state, since the probability associated with these
ideal events tends to zero. Instead, she can also accept
signals with a polarization sufficiently close to the desired
ones. This situation is illustrated in Fig. 3, where Alice
selects some valid regions for the angle θ. These regions
are marked with grey color in the figure. They depend on
an acceptance parameter Ω ∈ [0, π/4] that we optimize.
Specifically, whenever the value of θ lies within any of
the intervals ψ ± (π/4 − Ω) with ψ ∈ {0, π/2, π, 3π/2},
then Alice considers the pulse emitted by the source as a
valid signal. This last condition can also be written as
θ ∈
3⋃
1=0
[
(2i+ 1)
π
4
+ Ω, (2i+ 3)
π
4
− Ω
]
. (8)
Otherwise, the pulse is discarded afterwards during the
post-processing phase of the protocol, and it does not
4contribute to the key rate. The probability that a pulse
is accepted, pacc, is given by
pacc =
8
(
pi
4 − Ω
)
2π
= 1− 4Ω
π
. (9)
To increase this probability, one can reduce the value
of Ω. Note, however, that this action also results in an
increase of the quantum bit error rate (QBER) of the
protocol, that we shall denote as E. On the other hand,
when Ω increases, we have that both pacc and E decrease.
There is a trade-off on the acceptance parameter Ω. A
high acceptance probability pacc favors Ω ≈ 0, whereas a
low QBER favors Ω ≈ π/4. Note that in the limit where
Ω tends to π/4 we recover the standard BB84 protocol.
A. Lower bound on the secret key rate
The single photon signals emitted by the passive source
presented above, averaged over the values of Alice’s key
bit, are basis-independent. That is, they do not leak
any information to Eve about the basis of Alice’s signal
states. To see this, note that
∫ pi
4
−Ω
7pi
4
+Ω
|1θ〉〈1θ| dθ +
∫ 5pi
4
−Ω
3pi
4
+Ω
|1θ〉〈1θ| dθ
=
∫ 3pi
4
−Ω
pi
4
+Ω
|1θ〉〈1θ| dθ +
∫ 7pi
4
−Ω
5pi
4
+Ω
|1θ〉〈1θ| dθ
=
(π − 4Ω)
4
1 , (10)
for all Ω ∈ [0, π/4], and where the single photon state |1θ〉
is given by Eq. (3). Here 1 denotes the identity operator
in the single photon subspace.
To evaluate the performance of this passive source
we use the security analysis provided by Gottesman-
Lo-Lu¨tkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) in Ref. [8]. See also
Ref. [16]. It considers that Eve can always obtain full
information about the part of the key generated from the
multiphoton signals. This pessimistic assumption is also
true for the passive transmitter illustrated in Fig. 2 when
Alice and Bob use only unidirectional classical communi-
cation during the public-discussion phase of the protocol.
This result arises from the fact that all the photons con-
tained in a pulse are prepared in the same polarization
state and, therefore, no secret key can be distilled with
one-way post-processing techniques [17]. Note, however,
that such security analysis could leave still room for im-
provement when Alice and Bob employ two-way classical
communication. In this situation, it might be possible to
obtain secret key even from the multiphoton pulses since
the signal states prepared by the passive device are al-
ready mixed at the source. This last scenario, however,
is beyond the scope of this paper.
We further assume the typical initial post-processing
step in the BB84 protocol, where double click events are
not discarded by Bob, but they are randomly assigned to
single click events [18, 19]. The secret key rate formula
can be written as [8]
R ≥ qpacc
{
(Q− pmulti)
[
1−H(E1)
]
− Qf(E)H(E)
}
. (11)
The parameter q is the efficiency of the protocol (q = 1/2
for the standard BB84 protocol, and q ≈ 1 for its efficient
version [20]); Q is the gain, i.e., the probability that Bob
obtains a click in his measurement apparatus when Alice
sends him a signal state; f(E) is the efficiency of the
error correction protocol as a function of the error rate
E [21], typically f(E) ≥ 1 with Shannon limit f(E) = 1;
H(x) is the binary Shannon entropy function defined as
H(x) = −x log2 (x) − (1 − x) log2 (1− x); pmulti is the
multiphoton probability of the source, i.e.,
pmulti = 1− e−µ(1 + µ); (12)
and E1 denotes an upper bound on the single photon
error rate. In the case of the standard BB84 protocol
without decoy-states, this last quantity is given by [8]
E1 =
E
1− pmultiQ
. (13)
For simulation purposes we use the channel model and
detection device on Bob’s side described in Appendix A.
This model allows us to calculate the observed experi-
mental parameters Q and E. These quantities are given
in Appendix B. Our results, however, can also be applied
to any other quantum channel or detection setup, as they
depend only on the observed gain and QBER.
The resulting lower bound on the secret key rate is
illustrated in Fig. 4 (dashed line). In our simulation
we employ the following experimental parameters: the
dark count rate of Bob’s detectors is ǫB = 1 × 10−6,
the overall transmittance of his detection apparatus is
ηB = 0.1, and the loss coefficient of the quantum channel
is α = 0.2 dB/km. We further assume that q = 1/2,
and f(E) = 1.22. These data are used as well for the
simulations included in Sec. III. With this configuration,
it turns out that the optimal value of the mean photon
number µ decreases with the distance, while the value
of the parameter Ω increases. In particular, µ dimin-
ishes from ≈ 0.084 to approximately 4 × 10−3, while Ω
augments from ≈ 0.365 to ≈ 0.76. This result is not sur-
prising. At long distances the gain Q of the protocol is
very low and, therefore, it is especially important to keep
both the multiphoton probability of the source, and the
intrinsic error rate of the signals ρout,θ, also low. Fig. 4
includes an inset plot with the optimized parameters µ
(dashed line) and Ω (solid line). This figure shows as
well a lower bound on the secret key rate for the case
of an active source. The cutoff point where the secret
key rate drops down to zero is basically the same in both
cases. It is given by l ≈ 67.5 km. This result arises from
two main limiting factors: the multiphoton probability
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FIG. 4: Lower bound on the secret key rate R given by
Eq. (11) in logarithmic scale for the passive source illustrated
in Fig. 2 (dashed line). The signal states ρout,θ are given by
Eq. (6). For simulation purposes, we consider the following
experimental parameters: the dark count rate of Bob’s de-
tectors is ǫB = 1 × 10
−6, the overall transmittance of Bob’s
detection apparatus is ηB = 0.1, the loss coefficient of the
channel is α = 0.2 dB/km, q = 1/2, and the efficiency of
the error correction protocol is f(E) = 1.22. The solid line
represents a lower bound on R when Alice employs an active
source. The inset figure shows the value for the optimized
parameters µ (dashed line) and Ω (solid line) in the passive
setup.
of the source, and the dark count rate of Bob’s detectors.
Note that in these simulations we do not consider any
misalignment effect in the channel or in Bob’s detection
apparatus. From the results shown in Fig. 4 we see that
the performance of the passive scheme is similar to the
one of an active setup, thus showing the practical inter-
est of the passive source. The (relatively small) difference
between the achievable secret key rates in both scenarios
is due to two main factors: (a) the probability pacc to
accept a pulse emitted by the source, which is pacc < 1
in the passive setup, and pacc = 1 in the active scheme,
and (b) the intrinsic error rate of the signals accepted by
Alice, that is zero only in the case of an active source.
B. Alternative implementation scheme
The passive setup shown in Fig. 2 requires that Alice
employs two independent sources of phase-randomized
strong coherent pulses. Alternatively to this scheme, Al-
ice could as well employ, for instance, the device illus-
trated in Fig. 5. This setup has only one laser diode, but
follows a similar spirit like the original scheme shown
in Fig. 2, where a polarization measurement is used to
determine the polarization of the incoming signals. The
main idea is just to replace two single light pulses emitted
by two different diodes with two consecutive light pulses
generated by only one laser diode.
To keep the analysis simple, the scheme includes as
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FIG. 5: Alternative implementation scheme with only one
pulsed laser source. The delay introduced by one arm of the
interferometer is equal to the time difference between two con-
secutive pulses. The polarization rotator R−45◦ changes the
+45◦ linear polarization of the incoming pulses to −45◦ linear
polarization. The intensity modulator (IM) blocks either all
the even or all the odd optical pulses in mode a.
well an intensity modulator (IM) to block either all the
even or all the odd pulses in mode a (see Fig. 5). The
main reason for blocking half of these pulses is to sup-
press possible correlations between them. That is, the
action of the IM guarantees that the signals that go to
Bob are precisely tensor product of states of the form
given by Eq. (6). This way we can directly apply the se-
curity evaluation provided in the previous section. This
transmitter requires, therefore, an active control of the
functioning of the IM. Note, however, that this configu-
ration might still be much less of a problem than using a
polarization modulator to actively generate BB84 signal
states at high rates, since no RNG is needed to control
the IM. Thanks to the one-pulse delay introduced by one
arm of the interferometer, it can be shown that both
setups in Fig. 2 and Fig. 5 are completely equivalent, ex-
cept from the resulting secret key rate. More precisely,
the secret key rate in the passive scheme with two lasers
is double than that in the setup illustrated in Fig. 5, since
half of the pulses are now discarded.
To conclude, let us mention that similar ideas to the
ones presented in this section can also be used in other
implementations of the BB84 protocol with a different
signal encoding. One example are those QKD experi-
ments based on phase encoding, which turns out to be
more suitable to use in combination with optical fibers
than polarization encoding [1]. This situation is illus-
trated in Fig. 6, where now Alice uses a BS of very small
transmittance (t ≪ 1) to split phase-randomized strong
coherent pulses into two light beams. The strong beam
is used to measure the value of its phase relative to some
local reference phase by means of a phase measurement,
while Alice sends the weak signal to Bob. Like in the pas-
sive source shown in Fig. 2, Alice can select some valid re-
gions for the measured phase, and the analysis presented
before also applies straightforwardly to this scenario.
6ρ
BS
t
|vac〉
ρ
Phase
measurement
out,θsource
FIG. 6: Basic setup of a passive BB84 QKD phase encoding
transmitter with strong coherent light. The mean photon
number of the signal states ρsource can be chosen very high;
for instance, ≈ 108 photons.
III. PASSIVE TRANSMITTER WITH SINGLE
PHOTON SOURCES
The passive state preparation schemes with coherent
light introduced in the previous section deliver a key gen-
eration rate of order O(η2sys), where ηsys denotes the over-
all transmittance of the system. To achieve higher secure
key rates over longer distances there are two main alter-
natives: To combine them with the decoy-state method
[9, 10], or to employ SPS. In the first case, Alice can
vary the mean photon number of the BB84 signals just
by using a variable optical attenuator or a passive decoy-
state setup [14]. Here, we will concentrate on the second
scenario, and we present a simple passive BB84 source
which uses practical SPS. Note that the passive trans-
mitters analyzed in Sec. II cannot be employed with SPS,
since those setups need to operate with light pulses of
sufficiently high intensity to be able to measure their po-
larization with certain precision.
The basic setup is illustrated in Fig. 7. It contains four
light sources, each of them preparing a different BB84
polarization state. The working principle of this device
is rather simple. Let us first consider the ideal case. That
is, each photon source in the figure emits precisely one
single photon in the desired polarization state, and all
detectors have perfect detection efficiency (ηdet = 1) and
dark count rate ǫA equal to zero. In this scenario, we
have that whenever Alice observes a click in precisely
three of the “signal detectors”DH, DV, DL, and DR, and
no click in detector D (see Fig. 7), the state generated
by the source, that we shall denote as ρout,j with j ∈
{H,V,L,R}, consists of just one photon prepared in the
polarization state associated with the signal detector Dj
which did not click. For example, suppose that Alice
obtains a click in detectorsDV, DL, and DR, and no click
in detectors DH and D, then the output state is given by
ρout,H = |1, 0〉l〈1, 0|, where |1, 0〉l denotes a Fock state
with one photon in the horizontal polarization mode and
zero photons in the vertical polarization mode.
In order to evaluate the performance of this setup in
a more realistic scenario, we shall consider practical SPS
ρ
out, j
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BS
t
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PBS
BS
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BS
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D
D
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L
R
V
FIG. 7: Basic setup of a passive BB84 QKD transmitter with
practical SPS. Each laser diode emits pulses prepared in a
different BB84 polarization state: H [horizontal], V [vertical]
linear polarizations, and L [left], R [right] circular polariza-
tions. The parameter t represents the transmittance of the
BS’s. All detectors shown in the figure denote threshold sin-
gle photon detectors.
emitting Fock diagonal states of the form
ρsource,j =
∞∑
n=0
pn|n〉j〈n|, (14)
with j ∈ {H,V,L,R}. Furthermore, for simplicity, we
assume that the photon number distribution pn of each
source is the same for all them, independently of their
polarization.
To characterize the threshold single photon detectors
DH, DV, DL, DR, and D, we use a POVM with two
elements, Fvac and Fclick, given by
Fvac = (1 − ǫA)
∞∑
n=0
(1− ηdet)n|n〉〈n|, (15)
and Fclick = 1 − Fvac, where again the parameter ηdet
denotes the detection efficiency of the detector, and ǫA
represents its probability of having a dark count. We
assume that ǫA is, to a good approximation, independent
of the incoming signals. The outcome of Fvac corresponds
to no click in the detector, while the operator Fclick gives
precisely one detection click, which means at least one
photon is detected.
After a tedious calculation, one can obtain the condi-
tional output state ρout,j given that Alice observes a click
only in three of the signal detectors Di and no click in
detectors D and Dj (with j 6= i). A mathematical ex-
pression for this state, together with its associated prob-
ability, is given in Appendix C.
7A. Lower bound on the secret key rate
Like in Sec. II A, the single photon signals emitted by
the passive source illustrated in Fig. 7 are also basis-
independent. To analyze the performance of this source
we use again the security results provided by GLLP in
Ref. [8]. See also Ref. [16]. The secret key rate for-
mula is given by Eq. (11). Note, however, that such
security analysis might overestimate the eavesdropping
capabilities of Eve in this scenario even when Alice and
Bob use one-way post-processing techniques during the
public-discussion phase of the protocol. In contrast to
the case analyzed in Sec. II, now multiphoton pulses can
contain photons prepared in different polarization states.
This effect is similar to the one observed in those EB
implementations of the BB84 protocol that use, for in-
stance, a pulsed type-II down conversion source [22]. In
this sense, the passive source shown in Fig. 7 might be
more robust against the Photon Number Splitting (PNS)
attack [23] than an active one, since now Eve might not
be able to obtain always full information about the part
of the key generated with the multiphoton signals. Still,
the multiphoton problem is now on Bob’s side who gets
a noisy signal, which can contain photons not prepared
in Alice’s state. The possibility to distill a secret key
from multiphoton pulses in this situation constitutes an
interesting theoretical question that deserves further in-
vestigations, but it is beyond the scope of this paper.
To evaluate the secret key rate formula given by
Eq. (11), we need to obtain the gain Q, the error rate
E, and the multiphoton probability pmulti of the source.
These parameters are calculated in Appendix D. For
that, we use again the channel model and detection de-
vice described in Appendix A. The resulting lower bound
on R is illustrated in Figs. 8, 9, and 10, for three differ-
ent photon number distributions pn of the practical SPS.
For simulation purposes, we use the same experimental
data employed in Sec. II A, and we further assume that
Alice’s detectors have a dark count rate ǫA = 1× 10−6.
The first example plotted in Fig. 8 considers the case
of perfect on-demand SPS, i.e., we impose p1 = 1 in
Eq. (14). We study three different situations, depending
on the actual value of the efficiency ηA of Alice’s detec-
tors, and we optimize the transmittance t of the BS’s
on Alice’s side for each case. In particular, we assume
ηA = 1, ηA = 0.5, and ηA = 0.1. This figure includes as
well a lower bound on R when Alice employs an active
source that emits single photon pulses (thick solid line).
The cutoff points where the secret key rate drops down
to zero are given by l ≈ 201.7 km (passive source with
ηA = 1), l ≈ 179.3 km (passive source with ηA = 0.5),
l ≈ 162.5 km (passive source with ηA = 0.1), and l ≈ 203
km (active scheme). From the results shown in this fig-
ure we see that, in this ideal scenario where p1 = 1, the
performance of the passive scheme is similar to the one of
an active setup only when the efficiency of Alice’s detec-
tors is relatively high. Note that the difference between
the achievable secret key rates in both scenarios comes
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FIG. 8: Lower bound on the secret key rate R given by
Eq. (11) in logarithmic scale for the passive setup illustrated
in Fig. 7 with perfect on-demand SPS, i.e., p1 = 1 in Eq. (14).
In the simulation we consider the following experimental pa-
rameters: the dark count rate of Alice’s and Bob’s detectors
is ǫA = ǫB = 1 × 10
−6, the overall transmittance of Bob’s
detection apparatus is ηB = 0.1, the loss coefficient of the
channel is α = 0.2 dB/km, q = 1/2, and the efficiency of
the error correction protocol is f(E) = 1.22. We further as-
sume the channel model described in Appendix A, where we
neglect any misalignment effect. Otherwise, the actual se-
cure distance will be smaller. The figure includes three cases,
depending on the actual value of the efficiency ηA of Alice’s
detectors, and we optimize the transmittance t of the BS’s on
Alice’s side for each case. In particular, we assume ηA = 1
(dashed line), ηA = 0.5 (thin solid line), and ηA = 0.1 (dash-
dotted line). The solid line represents a lower bound on R
when Alice employs an active source that emits single photon
pulses with probability one.
mainly from the probability pacc < 1 that Alice’s trans-
mitter produces a valid signal in the passive scheme (i.e.,
three of her signals detectors click). Specifically, when
the efficiency ηA of Alice’s detectors is too low, then also
the probability pacc decreases significantly, and therefore
the secret key rate decreases as well. The value of ηA
also influences the resulting cutoff points for the secret
key rate. For instance, when ηA decreases, the intrinsic
noise of Alice’s signals (i.e., the probability to produce a
wrong signal) can increase due to the dark counts of her
detectors. Note that this effect becomes more relevant
for low ηA. As a result, the cutoff point for the secret
key rate decreases.
The other two examples illustrated in Figs. 9 and 10
analyze the influence that the vacuum and multiphoton
probabilities of the practical SPS can have on the final
secret key rate. For that, we consider two different pho-
ton number distributions pn for the SPS described in
Eq. (14). In particular, Fig. 9 shows the case where
p0 = 0.0099, p1 = 0.9882, and p2 = 1 − p0 − p1 =
0.0019, while Fig. 10 assumes p0 = 0.2, p1 = 0.785, and
p2 = 1 − p0 − p1 = 0.015. In both cases, we evaluate
the same three scenarios contemplated in Fig. 8, i.e., we
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FIG. 9: Lower bound on the secret key rate R given by
Eq. (11) in logarithmic scale for the passive setup illustrated
in Fig. 7 with imperfect SPS. In particular, we consider that
the photon number distribution pn of the sources is given by
p0 = 0.0099, p1 = 0.9882, and p2 = 1− p0 − p1 = 0.0019. We
further assume the same experimental data used in Fig. 8. We
study three cases, depending on the actual value of the effi-
ciency ηA of Alice’s detectors, and we optimize the transmit-
tance t of the BS’s on Alice’s side for each case. Specifically,
we assume ηA = 1 (dashed line), ηA = 0.5 (thin solid line),
and ηA = 0.1 (dash-dotted line). The solid line represents a
lower bound on R when Alice employs an active source with
photon number distribution pn in combination with a BS. In
this last case, we optimize the value of the transmittance of
the BS as a function of the distance.
consider ηA = 1, ηA = 0.5, and ηA = 0.1. As expected,
when the vacuum probability p0 augments, the proba-
bility pacc decreases and, therefore, the secret key rate
decreases as well. Similarly, if the multiphoton prob-
ability p2 increases, the intrinsic noise of Alice’s signals
also augments, and both the secret key rate and its cutoff
point decreases. For comparison purposes, we consider as
well the situation where Alice uses an active source (thick
solid line) in combination with a BS whose transmittance
is optimized with the distance. In this last case, the slope
of the lower bound on R (when Alice employs an active
setup) increases slightly when the transmittance of this
additional BS starts to be less than one. This occurs, re-
spectively, at l ≈ 71 km (see Fig. 9), and l ≈ 22 km (see
Fig. 10). From these results, we see that also in these
two examples the performance of the passive scheme is
comparable to the one of an active setup when ηA is suf-
ficiently high. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that
the distance covered by a passive transmitter might be
even longer than the one of an active configuration for
some values of the photon number distribution pn and of
the parameter ηA (see, for instance, the dashed line in
Fig. 9). Let us emphasize, moreover, that, as discussed
above, in our security analysis we assume that multipho-
ton signals are always insecure (which is actually true
only in the case of an active device), and, therefore, there
might be still further room for improvement in the secret
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FIG. 10: Lower bound on the secret key rate R given by
Eq. (11) in logarithmic scale for the passive setup illustrated
in Fig. 7 with imperfect SPS. The photon number distribu-
tion pn of the sources is given by p0 = 0.2, p1 = 0.785, and
p2 = 1− p0− p1 = 0.015. We further assume the same exper-
imental data used in Fig. 8. We study three cases, depending
on the actual value of the efficiency ηA of Alice’s detectors,
and we optimize the transmittance t of the BS’s on Alice’s
side for each case. In particular, we assume ηA = 1 (dashed
line), ηA = 0.5 (thin solid line), and ηA = 0.1 (dash-dotted
line). The solid line represents a lower bound on R when Al-
ice employs an active source with photon number distribution
pn in combination with a BS. In this last case, we optimize
the value of the transmittance of the BS as a function of the
distance.
key rate which can be achieved with a passive device.
The passive source shown in Fig. 7 might be an inter-
esting alternative to implement the BB84 QKD proto-
col with practical SPS. However, let us mention that to
date there are still two main experimental challenges that
need to be overcomed in order to obtain relevant secret
key rates with such a device. On the one hand, we need
to develop single photon detectors with high quantum
efficiency that can operate at high clock rate. This rep-
resents an interesting technological challenge, especially
at telecom wavelengths where the efficiency of present-
day single photon detectors lie typically at roughly 10-
15%. In recent years, however, this field has advanced
substantially and there are reasons to be optimistic; for
instance, it has been shown lately that superconducting
transition-edge sensor detectors can provide photon num-
ber resolving capabilities at telecom wavelengths with
95% efficiency and negligible noise [24]. At visible wave-
lengths, silicon avalanche photodiodes (APD) are already
commercially available to offer high quantum efficiencies
(up to about 70-80%) and low dark count rates. This last
scenario, for example, is particularly relevant for free-
space QKD. On the other hand, we need to design high-
quality on-demand SPS. Note that the photon number
statistics used for simulations purposes in this section
assume on-demand SPS that are still beyond our present
experimental capability [25]. For instance, the normal-
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FIG. 11: Alternative implementation scheme with only one
photon source. The polarization rotators RV, RL, and RR,
change the horizontal polarization of the incoming pulses to
vertical polarization, left circular polarization, and right cir-
cular polarization, respectively.
ized second-order correlation function g(2) and average
photon number per pulse n¯ of the sources used in Figs. 9
and 10 are, respectively, g(2) = 0.0039 and n¯ = 0.992,
and g(2) = 0.0452 and n¯ = 0.815. Despite the remark-
able progress that has been made in recent years to gen-
erate indistinguishable on demand single photons, nowa-
days sub-Poissonian sources have a normalized second-
order correlation function that lies typically between 0.05
and 0.2 [25]. However, the biggest experimental chal-
lenge here is to increase the achievable collection effi-
ciency, which is usually below 10%. This means that the
probability to obtain an empty pulse is still rather high,
and therefore n¯ is relatively small [25]. As a result, the
acceptance probability pacc of the passive BB84 source
shown in Fig. 7 would be also quite small. Alternatively,
one may use heralded SPS based on a parametric down
conversion process, where the emission of an individual
photon is heralded by the detection of the twin-photon
[26]. For instance, the photon number distributions of
the sources used above can be generated with this type
of sources. In this last case, however, the secret key rate
formula should include an additional factor accounting
for this detection probability. As a consequence, the fi-
nal key rate can be substantially reduced.
To conclude this section, let as mention that (as in
Sec. II B) instead of using the passive source illustrated
in Fig. 7, Alice could as well employ, for instance, the
alternative scheme illustrated in Fig. 11. This setup is
similar to the one shown in Fig. 7, but has only one
photon source, which might make it more robust against
side-channel attacks hidden in the imperfections of the
light sources. The main idea is to replace four single-
photon pulses (with different polarizations) emitted by
four SPS by one four-photon pulse (with all their pho-
tons prepared in the same polarization state) together
with polarization rotators. The argumentation here goes
similar to the passive device presented in Fig. 7, and we
omit it for simplicity. The resulting secret key rate in this
scenario, however, might be lower than that in the pas-
sive setup analyzed in Sec. III, since now the probability
pacc to consider an output pulse as valid is also lower.
Note that the passive scheme shown in Fig. 11 has the
additional requirement that each photon of a four-photon
pulse needs to follow a different optical path, which is se-
lected by means of 50 : 50 BS’s. The photon number
statistics of the output signals generated by both passive
schemes are also different.
IV. CONCLUSION
Typical experimental realizations of quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD) protocols prepare the signal states by
means of an active source. In this article, we have inves-
tigated two different methods to passively generate the
signal states of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) QKD
protocol. Our methods need only linear optical compo-
nents and photodetectors, and represent an alternative to
those active sources that use external-driven elements.
In particular, we have showed that both coherent light
and practical single photon sources are suitable for pas-
sive generation of BB84 signals. In the asymptotic limit
of an infinite long experiment, we have proved that the
secret key rate delivered by a passive source with co-
herent light is similar to the one provided by an active
source, thus showing the practical interest of the passive
scheme. When Alice uses practical single photon sources,
we have showed that the distance covered by a passive
transmitter might be longer than the one of an active
configuration. This result is caused by the capacity of
the passive scheme to reduce the number of multiphoton
emissions of the source via a post-selection mechanism.
The main focus of this paper has been polarization-
based realizations of the BB84 protocol, which are par-
ticularly relevant for free-space QKD. However, we have
also showed that similar ideas can as well be applied to
other practical scenarios with different signal encodings,
like, for instance, those QKD experiments based on phase
encoding, which are more suitable to use in combination
with optical fibers.
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Appendix A: Bob’s detection setup and channel
model
In this Appendix we include a simple model to char-
acterize Bob’s detection device and the behavior of the
quantum channel. This model is used in Sec. II and
Sec. III to evaluate the performance of the two passive
BB84 state preparation schemes that we present there.
For simplicity, in our calculations we shall consider
that Bob employs an active BB84 detection setup. Note,
however, that the results contained in Sec. II and Sec. III
can be straightforwardly adapted to cover as well the case
where Bob uses a detection apparatus with passive basis
choice [12].
Specifically, we assume that Bob’s detection scheme
consists of a polarization analyzer and a polarization
shifter which effectively changes the polarization basis
of the subsequent measurement. The polarization an-
alyzer has two detectors, each of them monitoring the
output of a PBS. These detectors are characterized by
their detection efficiency ηdet and their dark count rate
ǫB [27]. Furthermore, we suppose that both detectors are
equal, and cannot distinguish the number of photons of
arrival signals. They provide only two possible outcomes:
“click” (at least one photon is detected), and “no click”
(no photon is detected in the pulse).
The action of such detection device can be described
by two positive operator value measures (POVM), one
for each of the two BB84 polarization bases β ∈ {l, c},
where l denotes a linear polarization basis and c is a
circular polarization basis [28]. Each POVM contains
four elements: Gβvac, G
β
0 , G
β
1 , and G
β
dc. The outcome
of the first operator, Gβvac, corresponds to no click in
the detectors, the following two POVM operators, Gβ0
and Gβ1 , give precisely one detection click (these are the
desired measurements), and the last one, Gβdc, gives rise
to both detectors being triggered. These operators can
be written as
Gβvac = [1− ǫB(2− ǫB)]F βvac,
Gβ0 = (1− ǫB)ǫBF βvac + (1− ǫB)F β0 ,
Gβ1 = (1− ǫB)ǫBF βvac + (1− ǫB)F β1 ,
Gβdc = 1 −Gβvac −Gβ0 −Gβ1 , (A1)
where the operators F βvac, F
β
0 , F
β
1 , and F
β
dc are defined
below. Eq. (A1) assumes that the background rate, is, to
a good approximation, independent of the signal detec-
tion. Moreover, for easiness of notation, we only consider
a background contribution coming from dark counts of
Bob’s detectors and we neglect other background contri-
butions like, for instance, stray light arising from timing
pulses which are not completely filtered out in reception.
The definition of the operators F βvac, F
β
0 , F
β
1 , and F
β
dc
includes as well the effect of the quantum channel. These
operators characterize Bob’s detection device, together
with the action of the quantum channel, in the case of
noiseless detectors. We consider a simple model of a
quantum channel in the absence of eavesdropping; it just
consists of a BS of transmittance ηchannel. For simplicity,
here we neglect any misalignment effect in the channel.
In this scenario, the operators F βvac, F
β
0 , F
β
1 , and F
β
dc
have the form [18, 29]
F βvac =
∞∑
n,m=0
(1− ηsys)n+m|n,m〉β〈n,m|,
F β0 =
∞∑
n,m=0
[1− (1− ηsys)n](1 − ηsys)m|n,m〉β〈n,m|,
F β1 =
∞∑
n,m=0
[1− (1− ηsys)m](1 − ηsys)n|n,m〉β〈n,m|,
F βdc =
∞∑
n,m=0
[1− (1− ηsys)n][1− (1 − ηsys)m]
× |n,m〉β〈n,m|, (A2)
with β ∈ {l, c}. The signals |n,m〉l (|n,m〉c) represent
the state which has n photons in the horizontal (circular
left) polarization mode and m photons in the vertical
(circular right) polarization mode. The parameter ηsys
denotes the overall transmittance of the system. This
quantity can be written as
ηsys = ηchannelηB, (A3)
where ηB denotes the overall transmittance of Bob’s de-
tection apparatus, i.e., ηB includes the transmittance of
any optical component within Bob’s measurement device
together with the efficiency ηdet of his detectors.
The parameter ηchannel can be related with a trans-
mission distance d measured in km for the given QKD
scheme as
ηchannel = 10
−αd
10 , (A4)
where α represents the loss coefficient of the channel (e.g.,
free-space, or an optical fiber) measured in dB/km.
Appendix B: Gain and QBER of a passive BB84
QKD setup with coherent light
In this Appendix, we calculate the observed gainQ and
error rate E for the passive QKD device introduced in
Sec. II. For that, we use the channel model and detection
apparatus described in Appendix A. In the scenario con-
sidered, it turns out that the gain is independent of the
actual polarization of the signals ρout,θ given by Eq. (6)
and the basis β used to measure them. This parameter
has the form
Q = 1− Tr(Gβvacρout,θ) = 1− (1 − ǫB)2e−µηsys , (B1)
for all θ and β.
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The calculation of E is slightly more involved, since
the error rate varies depending on the value of the angle
θ. By symmetry, however, we can restrict ourselves to
investigate the QBER in only one of the valid regions
illustrated in Fig. 3; note that the error rate is the same
in all of them. For instance, let us consider the case
where θ ∈ [7π/4+Ω, π/4−Ω] (which corresponds to the
horizontal polarization interval), and let Eθ denote the
error rate of a signal state ρout,θ in that region. This
quantity can be written as
Eθ = Tr(G
l
1ρout,θ) +
1
2
Tr(Gldcρout,θ). (B2)
The first term in the summation represents the proba-
bility that the signal hits the wrong detector on Bob’s
side, i.e., he observes a click in the detector associated
with vertical polarization. The second term in Eq. (B2)
is the probability to have a double click on his detection
apparatus and assign to it a single click in the wrong de-
tector. Using Eqs. (A1)-(A2), we have that Eθ can be
further simplified as
Eθ =
1
2Q
{
ǫB(ǫB − 1)f0,θ +
[
2 + ǫB(ǫB − 3)
]
f1,θ
+
[
1 + ǫB(ǫB − 2)
]
fdc,θ + ǫB(2− ǫB)
}
, (B3)
where
fi,θ = Tr(F
l
i ρout,θ), (B4)
for all i ∈ {0, 1, dc}, and θ ∈ [7π/4+Ω, π/4−Ω]. In order
to calculate the probabilities fi,θ we use Eqs. (3)-(7) to
first rewrite the state ρout,θ given by Eq. (6) as
ρout,θ = e
−µ
∞∑
n=0
µn
n!
1
4n
n∑
k,k′=0
√(
n
k
)(
n
k′
)
× (1 + eiθ)k(1 + e−iθ)k′(1− eiθ)n−k
× (1− e−iθ)n−k′ |k, n− k〉l〈k′, n− k′|, (B5)
where |n,m〉l represents again the state which has n pho-
tons in the horizontal polarization mode and m in the
vertical polarization mode. We obtain
f0,θ = e
−ηsysµ
[
− 1 + e 12ηsysµ(1+cos θ)
]
,
f1,θ = e
−ηsysµ
[
− 1 + e 12ηsysµ(1−cos θ)
]
, (B6)
and
fdc,θ = 1 + e
−ηsysµ − e− 12ηsysµ(1+cos θ)
−e−ηsysµ sin2 ( θ2 ). (B7)
The quantum bit error rate E is then given by
E =
2
π − 4Ω
∫ pi
4
−Ω
7pi
4
+Ω
Eθ dθ, (B8)
and we solve this equation numerically.
Appendix C: Conditional output state
In this Appendix we provide a mathematical expres-
sion for the conditional output state ρout,j introduced in
Sec. III together with its associated probability. This
signal can be written as
ρout,j =
1
N
∞∑
n,m,k,l=0
q(n,m,k,l)σ
n,m,k,l
j , (C1)
where the parameters q(n,m,k,l) are given by q(n,m,k,l) =
unqmqkql, with
un = (1 − ǫA)tn
∞∑
k=n
pk
(
k
k − n
)[
(1 − ηdet)
× (1 − t)
]k−n
, (C2)
and
qn = t
n
∞∑
k=n
pk
(
k
k − n
)
(1− t)k−n
[
1− (1 − ǫA)
× (1 − ηdet)k−n
]
. (C3)
The states σn,m,k,lj have the form
σn,m,k,lj = (1− ǫA)
2−(n+m)4−(k+l)
n!m!k!l!
k+l∑
w,w′=0
min{w+n,w′+n}∑
r=0
min{k+l+m−w,k+l+m−w′}∑
s=0
g(n,m,k,l,w,w′,r,s)(1− ηdet)r+s
× h(n,m,k,l,w,w′,r,s)|w + n− r, k + l +m− w − s〉j〈w′ + n− r, k + l +m− w′ − s|, (C4)
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where |n,m〉j represents the state which has n photons in
the polarization mode associated with the signal detector
Dj which did not click, and m photons in its orthogonal
polarization mode. The functions g(n,m,k,l,w,w′,r,s) and
h(n,m,k,l,w,w′,r,s) which appear in Eq. (C4) are defined,
respectively, as
g(n,m,k,l,w,w′,r,s) = f(w,k,l)f(w′,k,l)f(r,w,n)f(r,w′,n)
× f(s,k+l−w,m)f(s,k+l−w′,m), (C5)
with f(x,y,z) given by
f(x,y,z) =
min{x,y}∑
s=max{0,x−z}
(
y
s
)(
z
x− s
)
(−1)z−x+s, (C6)
and
h(n,m,k,l,w,w′,r,s) = r!s!
√
(w + n− r)!
√
(w′ + n− r)!
×
√
(k + l +m− w − s)!
√
(k + l +m− w′ − s)!.(C7)
The normalization factor N of the output states ρout,j
does not depend on the parameter j. It can be calculated
as
N =
∞∑
n,m,k,l=0
q(n,m,k,l)Tr(σ
n,m,k,l
j ), (C8)
where the quantities Tr(σn,m,k,lj ) are given by
Tr(σn,m,k,lj ) = (1 − ǫA)
2−(n+m)4−(k+l)
n!m!k!l!
k+l∑
w=0
w+n∑
r=0
k+l+m−w∑
s=0
(1− ηdet)r+sg(n,m,k,l,w,w,r,s)
× h(n,m,k,l,w,w,r,s). (C9)
for all j.
Finally, we have that the probability that Alice pro-
duces a valid output state, i.e., only three of her signal
detectors Di click and D does not click, that we shall
denote as pacc, is given by
pacc = 4N. (C10)
Appendix D: Gain, QBER, and multiphoton
probability of a passive BB84 QKD setup with
practical SPS
It turns out that the gain of the protocol is independent
of the polarization j of the signals ρout,j and the basis β
used to measure them. This parameter can be expressed
as
Q = 1− Tr(Gβvacρout,j) = 1−
[1− ǫB(2− ǫB)](1− ǫA)
N
×
∞∑
n,m,k,l=0
q(n,m,k,l)
2−(n+m)4−(k+l)
n!m!k!l!
k+l∑
w=0
w+n∑
r=0
×
k+l+m−w∑
s=0
(1− ηdet)r+s(1− ηsys)n+m+k+l−r−s
× g(n,m,k,l,w,w,r,s)h(n,m,k,l,w,w,r,s), (D1)
for all j and β.
The QBER has also the same value for all possible
polarization states ρout,j emitted by Alice. Therefore,
like in Appendix B, in order to calculate it we can restrict
ourselves to only one given polarization j. For instance,
let us assume that the state produced by the source is
ρout,H, that is, j = H. In this case, the error rate can be
written as
E = Tr(Gl1ρout,H) +
1
2
Tr(Gldcρout,H), (D2)
where the first term is the probability that the signal
hits the wrong detector on Bob’s side, and the second
term denotes the probability to have a double click and
assign to it a single click in the wrong detector. Like in
Appendix B, this quantity can be further simplified as
E =
1
2Q
{
ǫB(ǫB − 1)f0,H +
[
2 + ǫB(ǫB − 3)
]
f1,H
+
[
1 + ǫB(ǫB − 2)
]
fdc,H + ǫB(2− ǫB)
}
, (D3)
where fi,H = Tr(F
l
i ρout,H) for all i ∈ {0, 1, dc}. The prob-
abilities fi,H can be obtained directly using Eqs. (A2)-
(C1). In particular, we find that
f0,H =
(1 − ǫA)
N
∞∑
n,m,k,l=0
q(n,m,k,l)
2−(n+m)4−(k+l)
n!m!k!l!
×
k+l∑
w=0
w+n∑
r=0
k+l+m−w∑
s=0
(1− ηdet)r+s
× [1− (1 − ηsys)w+n−r](1− ηsys)k+l+m−w−s
× g(n,m,k,l,w,w,r,s)h(n,m,k,l,w,w,r,s),
f1,H =
(1 − ǫA)
N
∞∑
n,m,k,l=0
q(n,m,k,l)
2−(n+m)4−(k+l)
n!m!k!l!
×
k+l∑
w=0
w+n∑
r=0
k+l+m−w∑
s=0
(1− ηdet)r+s(1− ηsys)w+n−r
× [1− (1 − ηsys)k+l+m−w−s]g(n,m,k,l,w,w,r,s)
× h(n,m,k,l,w,w,r,s), (D4)
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and
fdc,H =
(1− ǫA)
N
∞∑
n,m,k,l=0
q(n,m,k,l)
2−(n+m)4−(k+l)
n!m!k!l!
×
k+l∑
w=0
w+n∑
r=0
k+l+m−w∑
s=0
(1− ηdet)r+s
× [1− (1− ηsys)w+n−r][1− (1 − ηsys)k+l+m−w−s]
× g(n,m,k,l,w,w,r,s)h(n,m,k,l,w,w,r,s). (D5)
Finally, the multiphoton probability of the source,
pmulti, is as well independent of the value of the polariza-
tion j. It can be obtained as
pmulti = 1−
1∑
n=0
1−n∑
m=0
Tr
(
|n,m〉j〈n,m|ρout,j
)
= 1− p0,0,j − p0,1,j − p1,0,j, (D6)
where the probabilities pn,m,j are defined as
pn,m,j ≡ 〈n,m|ρout,j|n,m〉j . (D7)
After a short calculation, we find that
p0,0,j =
1
N
∞∑
n,m,k,l=0
q(n,m,k,l)
2−(n+m)4−(k+l)
n!m!k!l!
× (1− ǫA)
k+l∑
w=0
(1− ηdet)n+m+k+l
× g(n,m,k,l,w,w,w+n,k+l+m−w)
× h(n,m,k,l,w,w,w+n,k+l+m−w), (D8)
p0,1,j =
1
N
∞∑
n,m,k,l=0
q(n,m,k,l)
2−(n+m)4−(k+l)
n!m!k!l!
×
min{k+l,k+l+m−1}∑
w=0
(1− ηdet)n+m+k+l−1
× (1 − ǫA)g(n,m,k,l,w,w,w+n,k+l+m−w−1)
× h(n,m,k,l,w,w,w+n,k+l+m−w−1), (D9)
and
p1,0,j =
1
N
∞∑
n,m,k,l=0
q(n,m,k,l)
2−(n+m)4−(k+l)
n!m!k!l!
×
k+l∑
w=max{0,1−n}
(1− ηdet)n+m+k+l−1
× (1− ǫA)g(n,m,k,l,w,w,w+n−1,k+l+m−w)
× h(n,m,k,l,w,w,w+n−1,k+l+m−w). (D10)
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